Mr. SCHIFF. Mr. Speaker, the motion to recommit is based on bipartisan legislation that I introduced, along with Representatives Flake, Harman and Inglis, dealing with the NSA surveillance program. And the basic premise of this legislation is that the Government must have all the tools it needs, it must have all the authority it needs to pursue al Qaeda using every tool in the toolbox.
But the premise is also that we are a Nation of laws, and that whereas the Commander in Chief has the authority to eavesdrop and surveil off American shores, when it comes to the electronic surveillance of Americans on American soil, Congress has the authority to regulate that surveillance. And, in fact, Congress has regulated that surveillance through title III and through the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act; and, in fact, those two laws form the exclusive authority to surveil Americans on American soil.
Now, we have learned, both through a disclosure in The New York Times and through the disclosures of the present administration, that there is an NSA surveillance program that, among others things, surveils conversations between Americans or people on U.S. soil and people overseas who may be affiliated with al Qaeda. Other than a small number of us, we don't know much about the contours of this program.
Recently when the Attorney General testified in the Judiciary Committee, I asked about the limiting principle of this program: Was it restricted only to these international calls? What if the Attorney General decided tomorrow or the administration decided tomorrow that it had the inherent authority as Commander in Chief to tap purely domestic calls between two Americans; did it feel it would need to go to court for that authority? And the Attorney General said he would not rule it out. He would not rule out having the pure authority, without going to court, to tap the calls between two Americans on American soil.
So what is the limiting principle if this program can change from day to day without the input of Congress? The only limiting principle is the good faith of the executive, which when the executive shows it is infallible might be a sufficient limiting principle. But the executive is no more infallible than we are here in Congress, and so we have a role to play.
And this motion to recommit says that that role is the following: that, first, when we pass a law, like FISA and Title III, where we say the exclusive means of domestic eavesdropping is under these provisions with court approval, we mean what we say; that, second, the authorization to use military force that we voted on in the immediate aftermath of 9/11 did not create an exception to the authority to eavesdrop on Americans on American soil; that, third, if the President believes that FISA or existing law is insufficient to the task, he should come to Congress through his representatives and ask us to amend the law.
And this is what is most disturbing about what has happened so far. When the administration did come in the context of the PATRIOT bill and asked us to change FISA, we made changes to FISA. When one of the Republican Senators asked the administration, do you need us to change FISA more; is there a problem with FISA; is it not keeping pace with the terrorists or technology? The answer from the administration was, no, FISA is working just fine. The more truthful answer would have been, no, because we don't feel bound by FISA. We feel we can do what we choose to, what we feel we must, without consulting with Congress.
So this bill says, importantly, that if the administration feels that existing law is not enough, it should come to us and ask for amendment. And, finally, it asks the administration to report to Congress on the extent to which Americans have been surveilled on American soil so we can do our job as a coequal branch of government.
Mr. Speaker, I yield to my colleague, the ranking member from California.