Introduction of Legislation to Expand Defense Department Authority for Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Programs CONGRESSMAN ADAM B. SCHIFF OF CALIFORNIA IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES Friday, May 09, 2003 Mr. SCHIFF. Mr. Speaker, I rise today to introduce legislation that is of utmost importance to our national security and our future as a global community. My legislation will expand the Defense Department's authority for Nunn-Lugar cooperative threat reduction programs outside of the former Soviet Union. My bill will authorize efforts to dismantle and destroy nuclear, chemical, and other weapons of mass destruction in nations such as Pakistan, India, North Korea, China, Iran, and Iraq. These programs have a single objective: to reduce stockpiles of nuclear (and non-nuclear) materials in both military and nonmilitary facilities that may be converted to weapons of mass destruction to prevent such highly dangerous materials from being stolen or sold to terrorist organizations. It is critical for our national security to ensure that terrorists do not have easy access to weapons of mass destruction, particularly nuclear weapons. Over a decade ago, the landmark Nunn-Lugar cooperative threat reduction legislation, the initiative of Senators Nunn and Lugar, was signed into law. This initiative was born out of necessity to ensure that the nuclear arsenal of the Soviet Union would not fall into the wrong hands as the Soviet empire was coming apart. Throughout the latter half of the Cold War, the Soviet and the US camps had achieved mutually assured destruction capability, which had resulted in an uneasy yet stable security with regard to our nuclear arsenals. The enemy was clear and identifiable. However, the demise of the Soviet empire ushered in a new post-Cold War period with unclear and unidentifiable threats, and a new and very real sense of urgency, instability and insecurity. At this critical juncture, Congress established the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program in 1991, authorizing the use of Defense Department funds to assist with the safe and secure transportation, storage, and dismantlement of nuclear, chemical and other weapons in the former Soviet Union. In the ten years since, while much has been done to dismantle Russia's and the former Soviet Republics' nuclear weapons, the dangers persist, and in some cases have increased. In addition to the traditional nuclear weapons and materials concerns in the former Soviet Union, there are new and emerging threats from nuclear proliferators such as North Korea, Pakistan, and China, as well as Libya, Iran, Iraq, and stateless terrorist organizations headed by individuals such as Osama Bin Laden, that are actively in search of their next deal on nuclear weapons technology and components. It is this latter type of threat--the unclear, mobile, and not easily identifiable source of threat--that compels us to continue and increase our efforts to secure nuclear weapons and materials wherever they may be found. The world has changed, and with it so to have the threats. We cannot afford to cut back on such worthwhile programs as Nunn-Lugar and other non-proliferation programs. There is much work to be done, and we must be increasingly vigilant in an ever-changing world with new threats that go far beyond nuclear weapons. Significant progress has been made thus far, as reported in the May 2001 Cooperative Threat Reduction Scorecard issued by the Department of Defense. With regard to the established CTR Baseline attributed to Russia under the START process, the Nunn-Lugar program has successfully deactivated 5,504 of the 13,3000 Warheads; destroyed 423 of the 1,473 ICBMs; eliminated 383 of the 831 ICBM Silos; eliminated 85 of the 167 Bombers; destroyed 483 of the 487 Long-Range Nuclear ALCMs; eliminated 352 of the 728 SLBM Launchers; eliminated 209 of the 936 SLBMs; destroyed 19 of the 48 SSBNs; and sealed all 194 Nuclear Test Tunnels. In addition, Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Belarus--the three former Soviet nuclear powerhouses--are nuclear weapons free, according to the Defense Threat Reduction Agency of the Department of Defense. The Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction program can and should be credited for significant achievements in reducing threats from the former Soviet Union. However, continuing economic and social weaknesses in Russia, coupled with an eroding early warning system, poorly secured Russian nuclear, biological and chemical weapons and materials, and poorly paid Russian weapons scientists and security personnel, increase the threat of mass destruction on an unprecedented scale, especially if they fall into the hands of terrorists or rogue nations. Mr. Speaker, now more than ever we must make a fundamental shift in the way we think about nuclear weapons, the spread of weapons of mass destruction, and our national security. My bill will authorize the Department of Defense to expand their cooperative threat reduction programs outside of the former Soviet Union.